Showing posts with label Steve Chesnut. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Steve Chesnut. Show all posts

Thursday, January 28, 2010

Former Overstock.com Insider David Chidester in the Hot Seat

Hopefully, David Chidester will not allow himself to be made into the fall guy by Overstock.com (NASDAQ: OSTK) and its CEO Patrick Byrne and as the Securities and Exchange Commission continues its investigation of the company. David Chidester is certainly now in the "hot seat." As I will detail below, David Chidester was a ten year veteran insider at Overstock.com. Chidester certainly knows where the black holes are to be found in Overstock.com's financial reporting. He is sure to face tough questioning by the SEC as its investigation expands.

David Chidester's tenure of Overstock.com CFO

During Chidester's tenure as CFO, every single initial financial report for every reporting period issued by Overstock.com from the company's inception to date has violated Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and other SEC disclosure rules. Overstock.com restated its financial reports two times due to accounting errors.

In February 2006, Overstock.com restated its financial reports from Q1 2002 to Q3 2005 due to inventory accounting errors.

In February 2006, the SEC Division of Corporation Finance discovered that Overstock.com's revenue accounting violated Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) since the company's inception.

In October 2008, Overstock.com restated its financial reports from Q1 2003 to Q3 2008 due to customer refund and credit errors. It was the second time in two years that Overstock.com had to restate its financial reports due to accounting errors.

From Q2 2007 to Q2 2008 Overstock.com violated SEC Regulation G by using an improper EBITDA calculation that materially overstated it financial performance. When I confronted management about its improper EBITDA calculations, Patrick Byrne, Jonathan Johnson, and David Chidester lied about the company's compliance with SEC Regulation G during quarterly conference calls. In Q3 2008, Overstock.com finally corrected its improper EBITDA calculation by calling it "adjusted EBITDA" when it restated financial reports and amended its filings with the SEC to correct certain GAAP violations involving customer refund and credit errors described above (Details here).

In January 2009 David Chidester was replaced by Steve Chesnut as CFO and was moved to the postion of Senior Vice President Internal Reporting and Information. In addition, Grant Thornton replaced PricewaterhouseCoopers as Overstock.com's auditors.

In September 2009, the SEC Enforcement Division started investigating Overstock.com after reports in this blog detailed how the company used an improper "cookie jar" reserve to material inflate its financial performance from Q4 2008 to Q3 2009.

In November 2009, Overstock.com fired Grant Thornton after new accounting errors were uncovered during a separate probe by the SEC Division of Corporation Finance. Grant Thornton wanted Overstock.com to restate its financial reports, like I have called for in my blog. Instead, Overstock.com fired Grant Thornton and filed an unreviewed Q3 2009 10-Q report.

On December 23, 2009, Overstock.com hired KPMG to replace Grant Thornton.

Roddy Boyd article

On January 19, 2010, The Big Money published an article by investigative reporter Roddy Boyd that exposed how Overstock.com purposely withheld information from investors during 2005 and 2006 about its inadequate internal controls and engaged in a New York State sales tax dodge scheme known as "Operation Heist and Freeze."

My separate examination of Overstock.com's SEC filings found that CEO Patrick Byrne and CFO David Chidester both signed Sarbanes-Oxley certifications for financial reports claiming that the company had effective internal controls over financial reporting, while internal company documents obtained by The Big Money contradict their representations to investors.

Those same financial reports that were certified by Byrne and Chidester were later restated two times: in February 2006 due to inventory accounting errors and in October 2008 due to customer refund and credit errors. Apparently, both Byrne and Chidester signed Sarbanes-Oxley certifications that were knowingly false.

The SEC is certainly going to expand its investigation to include false filings to investors by Byrne and Chidester. In addition, Overstock.com faces an investigation by the New York State Department of Corporation Finance for its sales tax dodge scheme reported by Boyd and known inside the company as "Operation Heist and Freeze."

Why Overstock.com and David Chidester parted ways

A day after Roddy Boyd's article was published, Overstock.com and David Chidester parted ways by "mutual agreement." In a tersely worded statement, the company disclosed:

On January 20, 2010 Mr. David K. Chidester left by mutual agreement, effective immediately, from his position as Senior Vice President, Internal Reporting and Information, of Overstock.com, Inc. (the “Company”).

Unlike other departures of key insiders, there were no words of praise for Chidester from Byrne or the company.

Apparently, the term "mutual agreement" means that Overstock.com does not want David Chidester to be readily available to KPMG during the year-end audit and Chidester does not want to be readily available to respond to KMPG's inquiries while an SEC investigation of Overstock.com is going on.

Perhaps Overstock.com is taking the "ignorance is bliss" approach to dealing with KPMG, its new auditors. Current CFO Steve Chesnut, who joined the company in January 2009, was not around during most of the improprieties being investigated by the SEC. While Patrick Byrne does not want Chidester, who knows where the bodies are buried, to stay around.

Other issues SEC is probably considering

In September 2009, the SEC also subpoenaed Overstock.com for documents related to those two prior restatements in 2006 and 2008 before Roddy Boyd broke his damning article. In June 2008, the SEC concluded an earlier investigation of Overstock.com and took no enforcement action against the company. In that earlier investigation, the SEC subpoenaed documents relating to Overstock.com's 2006 restatement of financial reports. Therefore, the SEC is taking a second look at Overstock.com's 2006 restatement of its financial reports.

Was the SEC tipped off by an insider with personal knowledge of black holes in Overstock.com's financial reporting? In any case, it's reasonable to assume that the SEC believes that Overstock.com's management "pulled the wool over their eyes" in its earlier investigation of the company.

On the hot seat

While David Chidester certainly has personal knowledge of improprieties at Overstock.com, I view him as a weak minded follower and not a leader type. According my sources, Chidester is "yes man" who eagerly catered to the whims of his ego centric boss Patrick Byrne. Therefore, investigators will probably put Chidester under tough scrutiny and enormous pressure in order to get him to cooperate and provide testimony implicating Byrne and others. I personally think it's just a matter of time before Chidester cuts a deal. How long is anyone's guess.

Written by,

Sam E. Antar

Disclosure:

I am a convicted felon and a former CPA. As the criminal CFO of Crazy Eddie, I helped Eddie Antar and other members of his family mastermind one of the largest securities frauds uncovered during the 1980's. I committed my crimes, simply because I could.

If it weren't for the efforts of the FBI, SEC, Postal Inspector's Office, US Attorney's Office, and class action plaintiff's lawyers who investigated, prosecuted, and sued me, I would still be the criminal CFO of Crazy Eddie today.

I do not own Overstock.com securities short or long. My research on Overstock.com and in particular its lying CEO Patrick Byrne is a freebie for securities regulators and the public in order to help me get into heaven, though I doubt that I will ever get there anyway. I will probably end up joining corporate miscreants such as Patrick Byrne in hell. In any case, exposing corporate crooks is a lot of fun for a forcibly "retired" crook like me and analyzing Overstock.com's financial reporting is a forensic accountant's wet dream.
KPMG has sponsored at least two of my free speaking engagements to universities and colleges.

Tuesday, December 29, 2009

Is Overstock.com Shopping for an Audit Opinion?

Updated

Overstock.com (NASDAQ: OSTK) just hired KPMG as its auditors to replace Grant Thornton who was recently fired by the company, despite previous assurances by CEO Patrick M. Byrne (photo on right) and company President Jonathan E. Johnson that they would not hire new auditors until after the Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Corporation Finance completed its review of certain financial reporting irregularities.

Both the SEC Enforcement Division and Division of Corporation Finance started investigating Overstock.com after I alerted them that the company violated Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) by improperly establishing what is known as "cookie jar" reserves to inflate its financial performance starting in Q4 2008. Afterwards, Overstock.com fired Grant Thornton as the company's auditors and publicly vilified them when they recommended another restatement of the company's financial reports, just as I previously called for in my blog. The company filed an "unreviewed" Q3 2009 10-Q and CEO Patrick Byrne and CFO Steve Chesnut did not sign required Sarbanes-Oxley certifications. NASDAQ sent Overstock.com a letter warning the company of a possible de-listing. NASDAQ recently granted Overstock.com an extension to comply with its listing requirements.

Patrick Byrne and Jonathan Johnson went back on their promise that they would not shop for an audit opinion. Both Byrne and Johnson previously told investors that Overstock.com would wait until after the SEC Division of Corporation Finance completed its review of the company's financial disclosures. See quotes from transcript below:

Willis Taylor - Gagnon Securities - Analyst: Since you've dismissed your auditor for a very specific accounting choice, when you go to select a new auditor, how do you prevent yourself from being accused of opinion shopping?
Jonathan Johnson - Overstock.com - President: That's a great question, Louis, and that's part of the reason that we've decided not to select a new auditor until this -- until we resolve this issue with the SEC.
We do not want to be accused of opinion shopping. We'd like the SEC to help us figure out -- we'd like them to say we've done it the right way or we've done it the wrong way. Once they say one of those two, we don't need to opinion shop.
Patrick Byrne - Overstock.com - Chairman and CEO: But, so, I would even say to the point that when people have contacted us, we have discouraged any communication on the grounds that we got -- for just that reason -- well, I have the -- no matter who we talk to now, then whoever we ultimately pick, people are going to say, well, you did this because you opinion shop.
So we're really not having discussions with anybody. It's nice to get phone calls, but we're not talking to anybody until we get through this just to prevent -- just as a prophylactic measure.
Thank you, Willis. Did you have another question?

KPMG is taking a client with no management integrity as is well advised to study SAS No. 99 about "Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit" regarding the unethical "tone at the top" set by Overstock.com's unprincipled management team.

Every single initial financial report for every reporting period issued by Overstock.com has failed to comply with GAAP and other SEC disclosure rules since the company's inception. Overstock.com has restated its financial reports two times in the last three years and now is trying to avoid a third restatement of financial reports resulting from its improper use of "cookie jar" reserves to inflate its financial performance from Q4 2008 to Q3 2009.

Overstock.com has engaged in a vicious campaign to stalk, harass, and intimidate its critics. Judd Bagley, a creepy cyberstalker hired by Patrick Byrne, recently violated Facebook's Statement of Rights and Responsibilities and deceptively posed as "Larry Bergman" in an effort to gather personal information and spy on Patrick Byrne's critics, including me.

Altogether, Judd Bagley posted on DeepCapture.com (a blog funded by Patrick Byrne and heavily promoted on Overstock.com's web site) an enemies list including the names of 7,483 "Facebook friends" of Patrick Byrne's critics. That enemies list included spouses, minor children, and other people that have nothing to do with Overstock.com, Patrick Byrne, or Byrne's delusional short selling conspiracy theories.

Judd Bagley, posing as an imposter, even tried to "Facebook friend" minor children! The nauseating Bagley even encouraged readers to dig into the backgrounds of family members of Byrne's critics, even their minor children, too.

Investigative reporter and blogger Gary Weiss's discovered the pretexting scam by Overstock.com. Barry Ritholtz, another stalking victim of the company, has called for a boycott of Overstock.com in his widely followed blog (107,000 subscribers).

In Going Concern, Caleb Newquist wrote:

Sorry, dear reader but apparently the high profile cat fight between the company and Grant Thornton wasn’t enough to scare KPMG off. Not even the very public revelation of Patsy’s creepy-ass stalking of Overstock critics in the financial media and blogosphere caused the KPMG partners in SLC to turn this client down.
Oh, and not to mention a management team who thought that filing unreviewed 10-Q was the best course of action.

While Adrienne Gonzalez, another widely read accounting blogger, was even more blunt in her criticism of KPMG:

F..cking KPMG. Come on, you can do better than this.

She added:

KPMG just sold its ass up the river.

Hopefully, KPMG (see explanatory note below) has learned from its improper establishment of "cookie jar" reserves that aided the Crazy Eddie fraud in 1986 (See my whitecollarfraud.com Crazy Eddie Fraud page and section entitled, "Too much earnings inflation in fiscal year 1986"). However, KPMG did not seem to learn anything about taking clients like Crazy Eddie that lack management integrity.

Gary Weiss noted:

Hey, somebody had to get the job eventually. Bernie Madoff's auditor is unavailable, so Byrne chose the next best thing -- the auditor who, as Sam points out, let Crazy Eddie get away with murder.

KPMG's audit crew was a fun bunch to hang with, back in the day. During the Crazy Eddie investigation, I was once asked by the SEC if I got the audit partner "laid, relayed, and parlayed."

KPMG is well advised to read my open letters to the SEC (please note that each letter is based on Overstock.com's deliberately vague, incoherent, and inconsistent, and often contradictory disclosures at the time each one was issued):

08/05/09: Open Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission: Stop Overstock.com GAAP Violations Now!

11/22/09: Open Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission Part 2: New Information on Overstock.com's GAAP and SEC Disclosure Violations

11/23/09: Open Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission Part 3: Overstock.com Lied About Grant Thornton and Concealed Error

11/26/09: Open Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission Part 4: Patrick Byrne Ignores Real Issues As He Vilifies Grant Thornton

12/14/09: Open Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Part 5): Issuer Retaliation Complaint Against Overstock.com

Explanatory Note: Initially, Main Hurdman was Crazy Eddie's auditors until they merged with Peat Marwick Mitchell to become Peat Marwick Main. After another merger, Peat Marwick Main became known as KPMG.

Written by,

Sam E. Antar


Disclosure:

I am a convicted felon and a former CPA. As the criminal CFO of Crazy Eddie, I helped Eddie Antar and other members of his family mastermind one of the largest securities frauds uncovered during the 1980's. If it weren't for the efforts of the FBI, SEC, Postal Inspector's Office, and class action plaintiff's lawyers who investigated, prosecuted, and sued me, I would still be the criminal CFO of Crazy Eddie today.

I do not own Overstock.com securities short or long. My research on Overstock.com and in particular its lying CEO Patrick Byrne is a freebie for securities regulators and the public in order to help me get into heaven, though I doubt that I will ever get there anyway. I will probably end up joining corporate miscreants such as Patrick Byrne in hell. In any case, exposing corporate crooks is a lot of fun for a forcibly "retired" crook like me and analyzing Overstock.com's financial reporting is a forensic accountant's wet dream.

KMPG has sponsored at least two of my uncompensated fraud lectures at certain universities.

Monday, November 23, 2009

Open Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission Part 3: Overstock.com Lied About Grant Thornton and Concealed Error

Updated:

To the Securities and Exchange Commission:

In my last letter, I detailed how Overstock.com (NASDAQ: OSTK) deliberately concealed a 2008 overpayment to a fulfillment partner that was later recovered and improperly reported as income in Q1 2009. Now Grant Thornton has written a rare public letter to Overstock.com agreeing with me and taking issue with its former client's representations regarding that certain fulfillment partner in last week's conference call, and filings with the SEC. See below:

In its Q1 2009 10-Q, Overstock.com originally disclosed that:

In the first quarter of 2009, we reduced total cost of goods sold by $1.9 million for billing recoveries from partners who were underbilled in 2008 for certain fees and charges that they were contractually obligated to pay, and a refund due of overbillings by a freight carrier for charges from the fourth quarter of 2008. [Emphasis added.]

Overstock.com's Q1 2009 10-Q report made no mention of the 2009 recovery of a 2008 overpayment to a fulfillment partner. However, in its recent 8-K report for Q3 2009, Overstock.com later claimed that the $1.9 million collected from underbilled fulfillment partners also included the recovery of an overpayment to a fulfillment partner in the amount of $785,000, contrary to its prior disclosure:

In late Q1 2009, we received $785,000 relating to the partner overpayment discussed in point 1 above (even though the other issue with that partner remained unresolved). Thus, we recognized $785,000 in our 2009 Q1 Form 10-Q financials, which Grant Thornton reviewed as our auditors. In addition we highlighted $1.9 million (of which the $785,000 was a part) attributable to the collected overpayment, certain partner under-billing collections, and a freight carrier’s refund of overcharges in one-time, non-recurring income in that quarter’s earnings release, earnings conference call and Form 10-Q. [Emphasis added.]

In that same Q3 2009 8-K report (paragraph 7), Overstock.com claimed that Grant Thornton approved of the company's recognizing that 2009 $785,000 recovery of the 2008 overpayment to its fulfillment partner as income in Q1 2009, rather than restate its 2008 and 2009 financial reports, as I recommended in my blog:

As our auditors, Grant Thornton reviewed our financial statements in Q1 and Q2 2009 before we filed Form 10-Q’s for those quarters. Throughout 2009, our Audit Committee has repeatedly asked Grant Thornton if there was any accounting that it would do differently, and repeatedly received the answer, “No.” In fact, as recently as late-October 2009, Grant Thornton confirmed to us that it supported our accounting method for recognizing the $785,000. [Emphasis added.]

According to Grant Thornton's letter, it did not learn about the overpayment or recovery until October 2009 and they wanted Overstock.com to restate its 2009 financial reports, as I recommended. While Grant Thornton did not officially take a position that the 2008 financial reports must be restated, since its predecessor PricewaterhouseCoopers audited them, the restatement of the 2009 financial reports can only be accomplished by the restatement of the 2008 reports to correct the accounting error. Grant Thornton stated in its letter:


We disagree with the Company’s statement in paragraph 7 “that upon further consultation and review within the firm, Grant Thornton revised its earlier position” regarding the previously filed 2009 interim financial statements. This statement is not accurate. The Company brought the overpayment to a fulfillment partner to Grant Thornton’s attention in October. After additional discussions with the Company, the predecessor auditor and receipt of additional documentation from the Company we determined that the Company’s position as to the accounting treatment for the overpayment to a fulfillment partner was in error. Further the Company’s statement does not address the fact that the consultation noted in paragraph 5 was in relation to the ongoing incomplete review of the September 30, 2009 interim financial statements.
We have also read Item 4.02 of Form 8-K of Overstock.com, Inc. (“the Company”) dated November 16, 2009 and disagree with the statements concerning our Firm contained therein. During the course of our incomplete review of the Company’s September 30, 2009 financial statements, we advised the Company that disclosure should be made to prevent future reliance on its March 31, 2009 and June 30, 2009 financial statements. We advised the company to make the disclosure because we became aware that material modifications should be made to the previously filed 2009 interim financial statements to conform with US GAAP. Such modifications are necessary due to the Company having reduced its cost of goods sold in the first quarter of 2009 by receipt of a refund of an overpayment to a fulfillment partner. Further, the Company had additional items which we discussed that were still unresolved at the time we were dismissed, that could have a material impact on the first and second quarter financial statements for 2009. These items are identified by the Company in Paragraph 5 in item 4.01 of the Company’s Form 8-K. [Emphasis added.]

In other words, Grant Thornton says that they not know about the 2008 overpayment to a fulfillment partner or the Q1 2009 recovery of the overpayment until October 2009 or five months after Overstock.com filed its Q1 2009 10-Q report with the SEC. Overstock.com filed its Q1 2009 10-Q report on May 1, 2009 and Grant Thornton did not learn about the 2008 overpayment to the fulfillment partner or the 2009 recovery of that overpayment until October 2009 when it was reviewing the company's Q3 2009 financial reports.

The 2008 overpayment to the fulfillment partner and the 2009 recovery of that overpayment was never disclosed in Overstock.com's Q1 2009 10-Q report. It was hidden within recoveries from other fulfillment partners that were underbilled by the company from Q1 to Q3 2008, as I detailed above and in my last letter. Those other recoveries from fulfillment partners who were underbilled in 2008 were improperly reported as income in 2009 and the company must restate its 2008 financial reports to correct those errors, too.

In its 8-K filing above and during a recent conference call, Overstock.com had claimed that Grant Thornton agreed with the company that the recovery of the overpayment to the fulfillment partner was properly reported as income in 2009, even though that the company overpaid the fulfillment partner in 2008. However, Grant Thornton says that they never agreed with Overstock.com's improper accounting. Grant Thornton wanted Overstock.com to restate its prior financial reports to correct that error and other errors as I have detailed in my two previous letters (see below for links to those letters).

Overstock.com later fired Grant Thornton after they told the company to restate its financial reports as I called for. Subsequently, the company filed an "unreviewed" Q3 2009 10-Q report, and omitted required Sarbanes-Oxley certifications from its CEO Patrick Byrne and its CFO Steve Chesnut. On Friday, Overstock.com disclosed that NASDAQ sent the company a letter warning of a possible de-listing:

...notifying the company that it violated NASDAQ Listing Rules when it filed its Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2009 because the filing wasn’t reviewed in accordance with Statement of Auditing Standards No. 100. The letter also notified the company that the filing did not contain the certifications required under sections 302 and 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

Apparently, CEO Patrick Byrne duped New York Times columnist Floyd Norris, saying:

Grant Thornton, on the other hand, reviewed all this when they took the case, reviewed it at the end of Q1, reviewed it at the end of Q2, and in all cases they were asked, “Would you do this any other way?” and they said, “No.”

As I detailed above, Overstock.com concealed its overpayment to its fulfillment partner in its Q1 2009 10-Q (filed on May 1, 2009) and Grant Thornton did not learn about the overpayment until October. There is another $438,000 discrepancy that I outlined is my last letter, which may be one of the "unresolved" items that Grant Thornton referred to in its letter.

Overstock.com's false disclosures about the actions of its auditors and continued stonewalling of the restatement of its financial reports to comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) is a clear 10b-5 violation and also a violation of NASDAQ listing rules.

In any case, I warned Grant Thornton about their new audit client in March 2009. Finally, they know why!

Respectfully,

Sam E. Antar

Annexed hereto:

08/05/09: Open Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission: Stop Overstock.com GAAP Violations Now!

11/22/09: Open Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission Part 2: New Information on Overstock.com's GAAP and SEC Disclosure Violations

Blog update:

Floyd Norris covers the latest events here , Gary Weiss covers it here, and Caleb Newquist here.
Disclosure:

I am a convicted felon and a former CPA. As the criminal CFO of Crazy Eddie, I helped Eddie Antar and other members of his family mastermind one of the largest securities frauds uncovered during the 1980's. If it weren't for the efforts of the FBI, SEC, Postal Inspector's Office, and class action plaintiff's lawyers who investigated, prosecuted, and sued me, I would still be the criminal CFO of Crazy Eddie today.

I do not own Overstock.com securities short or long. My research on Overstock.com and in particular its lying CEO Patrick Byrne is a freebie for securities regulators and the public in order to help me get into heaven, though I doubt that I will ever get there anyway. I will probably end up joining corporate miscreants such as Patrick Byrne in hell.

In any case, exposing corporate crooks is a lot of fun for a forcibly "retired" crook like me and analyzing Overstock.com's financial reporting is a forensic accountant's wet dream.

Sunday, November 22, 2009

Open Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission Part 2: New Information on Overstock.com's GAAP and SEC Disclosure Violations

To the Securities and Exchange Commission:

On November 18, 2009, Overstock.com (NASDAQ: OSTK) held conference call where CEO Patrick M. Byrne, company President Jonathan E. Johnson, and CFO Steve Chesnut sought to justify the company's improper treatment of accounting errors under investigation by the SEC, the company's firing of Grant Thornton as its auditors after they told the company to correct its financial reports, and the company's filing of an "unreviewed" Q3 2009 10-Q with the SEC. Patrick Byrne did not permit me to ask crucial questions about Overstock.com's accounting irregularities while I was on the call and Jonathan Johnson lied when he said, "We we don't have any other questions lined up."

Therefore, in this letter I will analyze certain accounting issues under investigation by the SEC based on new company disclosures. In addition, I will show why Overstock.com's excuse for its treatment of accounting errors, which is based on the false premise that a "gain contingency" existed, lacks any credibility. Out of necessity I need to reiterate certain points I made in previous blog posts in order to explain new points below.

Overstock.com created an improper "cookie jar" reserve

In my first open letter to the SEC, I have described how in October 2008 Overstock.com restated its financial reports from Q1 2003 to Q3 2008 due to customer refund and credit errors. However, Overstock.com's restatement of financial reports failed to include corrections arising from underbilled offsetting costs and reimbursements that were already earned from its fulfillment partners during those same corresponding periods, less a reasonable estimate of uncollectable amounts. In effect, Overstock.com created what is known as a “cookie jar” reserve to materially overstate its future financial performance in violation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and SEC disclosure rules.

I recommended that Overstock.com correct its GAAP violations by restating its financial reports. Since then, both the Enforcement Division and Division of Corporation Finance started investigating Overstock.com's financial disclosures based on the analysis that I provided them.

Grant Thornton was fired after agreeing with my analysis of Overstock.com's improper accounting

As early as February 2009, I started notifying (here and here) both Overstock.com and the SEC of the company's most recent GAAP violations. Rather than appropriately restate Overstock.com's financial reports, Patrick Byrne responded on an internet chat board in an unsigned post using an alias saying that:

Antar's ramblings are gibberish. Show them to any accountant and they will confirm. He has no clue what he is talking about..... It's just a guy on a street corner, spouting gibberish, hoping someone will toss him a quarter.

After I complained to Overstock.com's audit committee member Joseph J. Tabacco and the SEC, Byrne removed his unsigned chat board post using an alias and replaced it with signed post identifying himself as "Patrick M. Byrne."

On November 13, 2009, Overstock.com’s audit committee and board of directors fired Grant Thornton as the company’s auditors, just about eight months after they replaced previously fired PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) as auditors. Grant Thornton was assisting the company in dealing with both SEC probes.

Apparently, Grant Thornton did not believe Patrick Byrne's claim that my analysis of Overstock.com's improper accounting was "gibberish." Grant Thornton ultimately agreed with me that Overstock.com's financial reports must be restated due to the same material accounting errors I pointed out in my blog.

However, Overstock.com claims that PWC disagrees with Grant Thornton:

Thus, we are in a quandary: one auditing firm [Grant Thornton] won’t sign-off on our Q3 Form 10-Q unless we restate our 2008 Form 10-K, while our previous auditing firm [PricewaterhouseCoopers] believes that it is not proper to restate our 2008 Form 10-K. Unfortunately, Grant Thornton’s decision-making could not have been more ill-timed as we ran into SEC filing deadlines. [Emphasis added.]

Simply said, PWC's audit opinions on Overstock.com's financial reporting are worthless. As I will describe later, the simple fact is that since Overstock.com's inception, every single financial report for each and every reporting period at least initially violated GAAP or some other SEC disclosure rules.

Likewise, every audit opinion issued by PricewaterhouseCoopers during those corresponding periods up to its last one in 2008 was flawed, too.

Investors cannot accurately compare changes in Overstock.com's financial performance from any reporting period to any previous comparable reporting period due to the company's GAAP violations. Those distortions in financial performance caused by material accounting errors in 2008 that overstated the Overstock.com's 2009 financial performance caused investors to overvalue the company's shares.

Yet during the "unreviewed" Q3 2009 10-Q conference call, Patrick Byrne praised PricewaterhouseCoopers saying:

Price gave us great service. We didn't have any beef with Price.

In fact, Grant Thornton agreed with me that PWC's last audit in 2008 was flawed and wanted Overstock.com to "restate" its "2008 Form 10-K" due to material accounting errors, even though Patrick Byrne has claimed that such errors were not material. Afterwards, Overstock.com fired Grant Thornton as its auditors, rather than restate the company's financial reports as they recommended.

During the "unreviewed" Q3 2009 10-Q conference call, an embittered Patrick Byrne expressed his utter contempt for Grant Thornton saying:

I am dissing [is people on the scene] -- I mean, I think Grant Thornton -- we're not going to be exchanging Christmas cards.

Later on, Jonathan Johnson chimed in saying:

...I'd just say that Pricewaterhouse has been very supportive of the positions that we've taken with the SEC.

In other words, Overstock.com and PricewaterhouseCoopers are "joined at the hip" and standing together "head to head and toe to toe" in their arrogant battle against the SEC, Grant Thornton, and the interests of investors to avoid restating its financial reports to comply with GAAP and SEC disclosure rules. In their collective twisted minds they just want to continue issuing financial reports that violate GAAP and SEC disclosure rules as they have done consistently in the past -- everyone else be damned!

Failure to maintain adequate internal controls

Overstock.com has utterly failed to maintain adequate internal controls and violated Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1934. In each and every period, CEO Patrick Byrne, former CFO David Chidester, and current CFO Steve Chesnut signed various certifications required under sections 302 and 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that turned out to be false.

NASDAQ de-listing letter

On November 20, 2009, Overstock.com disclosed the receipt of a de-listing letter from NASDAQ:

...notifying the company that it violated NASDAQ Listing Rules when it filed its Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2009 because the filing wasn’t reviewed in accordance with Statement of Auditing Standards No. 100. The letter also notified the company that the filing did not contain the certifications required under sections 302 and 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. [Emphasis added.]

In the past, Patrick Byrne, David Chidester, and Steve Chesnut had no issues signing "certifications required under sections 302 and 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002" that in each and every case initially turned out to be false. Evidently, both Patrick Byrne and new CFO Steve Chesnut are getting cold feet as they are certainly afraid to certify Overstock.com's latest reports as required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

Let's review Overstock.com's history GAAP and SEC disclosure violations before I analyze recent disclosures by the company and show why its treatment of accounting errors based on the false premise that a "gain contingency" existed lacks any credibility.

Background: A brief history of Overstock.com's GAAP and SEC disclosure violations and PWC's failed audits

In January 2006, Overstock.com restated financial reports issued from Q1 2002 to Q3 2005 due to inventory accounting errors.

In February 2008, the SEC Division of Corporation Financial concluded that Overstock.com violated GAAP in reporting revenues from the company's inception or from day one. This blog detailed how the company improperly provided the SEC with a flawed and misleading materiality analysis to convince regulators that its revenue accounting error was not material to avoid restating its financial reports.

Instead of restating prior financial reports to correct its material revenue accounting error, Overstock.com improperly used a one-time cumulative adjustment in its Q4 2007 financial report to hide the material impact of such errors on prior reporting periods. In Q4 2007, Overstock.com’s one-time cumulative adjustment reduced revenues by $13.7 million and increased net losses by $2.1 million resulting from the one-time cumulative adjustment to correct its revenue accounting errors.

From Q2 2007 to Q2 2008, Overstock.com reported an improper EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) that violated SEC Regulation G. Overstock.com improperly computed EBITDA by starting its calculation with operating income and adding back interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization, and stock based compensation. In other words, Overstock.com improperly defined EBITDA as operating income before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization, and stock based compensation.

However, SEC Regulation G requires EBITDA to be computed as net income (not operating income) before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (and not stock-based compensation). Therefore, Overstock.com was not permitted by Regulation G to use operating income as the starting point to compute EBITDA and the company was not allowed to eliminate stock-based compensation from its EBITDA calculation.

Since Overstock.com had reported losses from discontinued operations in various reporting periods, by improperly using operating income as the starting point to calculate EBITDA, it was materially overstating EBITDA by the amount of loss from discontinued operations. Likewise, by Overstock.com improperly eliminating stock-based compensation from its EBITDA calculation, the company was materially overstating its reported EBITDA by such amount in each reporting period.

When I confronted management about its EBITDA violations, they violated SEC rule 10b-5 by lying about their compliance with SEC Regulation G during Q2 and Q3 2008 conference calls. Just a few weeks later, Overstock.com finally corrected its improper EBITDA calculation by calling it "adjusted EBITDA" when it restated financial reports as described below and amended its filings with the SEC to correct certain newly disclosed GAAP violations.

Recently, the SEC took its first enforcement action under Regulation G and obtained an injunction and civil penalties against SafeNet Inc and its various officers for similar violations of Regulation G. I recommend that SEC also look into false representations of compliance under Regulation G by Overstock.com management when confronted by me about such violations.

Overstock.com's restatement of financial reports due to customer refund and credit errors improperly excluded offsetting costs and reimbursements due from its fulfillment partners

In October 2008, Overstock.com restated its financial reports from Q1 2003 to Q2 2008 due to customer refund and credit errors. It was the second time in two years that Overstock.com restated its financial reports due to GAAP violations. In fact, financial reports from Q1 2003 to Q3 2005 were restated twice: in 2006 due to inventory accounting errors and in 2008 due to customer refund and credit errors. PricewaterhouseCoopers had audited Overstock.com's prior financial reports and gave clean audit opinions prior to each restatement. Those clean audit opinions turned out to be false.

In the October 2008 restatement of financial reports, Overstock.com reversed its one-time cumulative adjustment in Q4 2007 used to correct its revenue accounting errors and also restated all financial statements to correct those errors, as I previously recommended. In addition, Overstock.com corrected its non-compliant EBITDA measure (as described above) in those amended financial reports. However, in the explanatory notes to those amended financial reports filed with the SEC, Overstock.com only made reference to corrections of its revenue accounting errors and customer refund and credit errors, but made no reference to the correction its non-compliant EBITDA calculation to comply with SEC Regulation G.

The company reported that the combined amount of revenue accounting errors (previously uncovered by the SEC) and newly disclosed customer refund and credit accounting errors resulted in a cumulative reduction in previously reported revenues of $12.9 million and an increase in previously reported accumulated losses of $10.3 million. Since Overstock.com had previously reported an increase in accumulated losses from its revenue accounting error of $2.1 million (see above), its new customer refund and credit errors resulted in an additional $8.2 million of accumulated losses in prior reporting periods.

Overstock.com created a "cookie jar" reserve to materially overstate future financial performance

However, the October 2008 restatement did not include corrections arising from underbilled offsetting costs and reimbursements that were already earned from its fulfillment partners during those same corresponding periods, less a reasonable estimate of uncollectable amounts. In other words, Overstock.com should have gone back and corrected or restated its financial reports to reflect income already earned from offsetting costs and reimbursements due from its fulfillment partners, less a reasonable estimate for uncollectable amounts. (See SFAS No. 154 and SFAS No 5 paragraph 1, 2, 8 and 23). It didn’t.

Instead, Overstock.com improperly deferred income than it earned but underbilled its fulfillment partners during prior reporting periods (before Q3 2008) to by moving income to future reporting periods (Q4 2008, Q1 2009, Q2 2009, and Q3 2009). In effect, Overstock.com improperly created a cookie jar reserve to materially inflate future earnings or reduce future losses. Overstock.com falsely claimed that a “gain contingency” existed and improperly recognized income from its fulfillment partners as monies were collected in future reporting periods on a non-GAAP cash basis (Q4 2008 $1.8 million, Q1 2009 $0.453 million, Q2 2009 $87k, Q3 2009 $40k).

If Overstock.com would have properly followed GAAP and restated its previous financial reports as required, in Q4 2008 the company would have: (1) reported a net loss instead of a net profit, (2) reported sixteen consecutive losses instead of 15 consecutive losses, and (3) failed to meet mean analysts’ consensus expectations for earnings per share. Any one of the above three materiality yardsticks triggers a restatement of prior year's effected financial reports under SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99.

How GAAP violations arising in 2008 materially overstated Overstock.com's financial performance in Q1 2009

PricewaterhouseCoopers improperly certified Overstock.com's 2008 financial reports and issued a clean audit opinion. As I described above, Grant Thornton agrees with me that the company's 2008 financial reports must be restated due to the GAAP violations I detailed above. Those GAAP violations materially overstated Overstock.com's financial performance in 2009 financial reports that Grant Thornton was supposed to audit before they were fired by the company. As I will describe below, accounting errors arising in 2008 inflated Overstock.com's financial performance in Q1 2009 as follows:

  • $453,000 collected from fulfillment partners underbilled in 2008
  • $785,000 recovered from a fulfillment partner who overbilled the company in 2008
  • $224,000 refund from a freight carrier who overbilled the company in 2008
  • $438,000 of explained discrepancies in disclosures.

In Q1 2009, Overstock.com reported a net loss of $2.099 million. However, the company should have reported a much bigger net loss of $4 million had it properly followed GAAP and materially understated its net loss by $1.9 million.

Overstock.com's latest disclosures show that the company hid a previously undisclosed accounting error and show even more accounting errors

In its Q1 2009 10-Q, Overstock.com disclosed that:

In the first quarter of 2009, we reduced total cost of goods sold by $1.9 million for billing recoveries from partners who were underbilled in 2008 for certain fees and charges that they were contractually obligated to pay, and a refund due of overbillings by a freight carrier for charges from the fourth quarter of 2008. [Emphasis added.]

In my previous open letter, I estimated collections from fulfillment partners in Q1 2009 at $1.411 million due to Patrick Byrne's deliberately vague Q1 2009 conference call remarks that the company received a refund from a freight carrier who overbilled the company "several hundred thousand dollars" in Q4 2008.

In my original analysis, I estimated that the refund received from that freight carrier was $500,000 based on Byrne's vague remarks. Therefore, I originally estimated the components of Overstock.com's Q1 2009 accounting errors as follows: $1.4 million collections from fulfillment partners underbilled in 2008 and $500,000 refunds from a freight carrier who overbilled the company in Q4 2008.

Based on Overstock.com's "unreviewed" Q3 2009 10-Q, I now estimate that the freight carrier refunded the company $224,000 in Q1 2009 and not $500,000. Overstock.com disclosed:

Also for the nine months period ended September 30, 2009, we reduced total cost of goods sold by $301,000 due to a refund of overbillings by a freight carrier for charges from the fourth quarter of 2008.

In addition, Overstock.com disclosed:

For the three months ended September 30, 2009, we reduced total cost of goods sold by $77,000 due to a refund of overbillings by a freight carrier for charges from the fourth quarter of 2008.

Since the company did not disclose receiving any refunds from a freight carrier in Q2 2009, I computed the amount of the refund from the freight carrier in Q1 2009 as follows: 9 months ended September 30 total of $301,000, less 3 months ended September 30 total of $77,000, equals Q1 2009 total of $224,000.

It turns out that in Q1 2009 Overstock.com had a previously undisclosed accounting error hidden in its financial disclosures. As I detailed above, Overstock.com originally claimed that it recovered:

...$1.9 million for billing recoveries from partners who were underbilled in 2008... and a refund due of overbillings by a freight carrier for charges from the fourth quarter of 2008.

However, in a recent 8-K report for Q3 2009, Overstock.com later claimed that the $1.9 million collected from underbilled fulfillment partners also included the recovery of an overpayment to a fulfillment partner in the amount of $785,000 contrary to its prior disclosure. See below:

In late Q1 2009, we received $785,000 relating to the partner overpayment discussed in point 1 above (even though the other issue with that partner remained unresolved). Thus, we recognized $785,000 in our 2009 Q1 Form 10-Q financials, which Grant Thornton reviewed as our auditors. In addition we highlighted $1.9 million (of which the $785,000 was a part) attributable to the collected overpayment, certain partner under-billing collections, and a freight carrier’s refund of overcharges in one-time, non-recurring income in that quarter’s earnings release, earnings conference call and Form 10-Q. [Emphasis added.]

Overstock.com may have hidden another accounting error in its financial disclosures. As I detailed above, originally Overstock.com claimed that:

...$1.9 million for billing recoveries from partners who were underbilled in 2008... and a refund due of overbillings by a freight carrier for charges from the fourth quarter of 2008.

Later the company disclosed that the $1.9 million amount included:

...$785,000 relating to the partner overpayment....

In Q1 2009, Overstock.com collected $453,000 from fulfillment partners it underbilled in 2008 and the company received a $224,000 refund from a freight carrier. Therefore, we are left with a $438,000 unexplained discrepancy.

See the updated chart below for the impact of Overstock.com's 2008 GAAP violations on 2009's financial reports based on the company's disclosures to date (Click on image to enlarge):



The distortions in Overtsock.com financial performance caused by its failure to restate its financial reports to correct accounting errors is actually greater than quarterly effects on reported income as detailed in the chart above. Overstock.com understated income in periods before Q4 2008 and likewise overstated income starting in Q4 2008. Therefore, any income earned in a prior reporting period shifted to a future comparable period doubles the increase in financial performance.

For example, if a company underreports income by $2 million in Q1 2008 and moves that income into Q1 2009, you have an overstatement of Q1 2009 income by $2 million. However, the increase in financial performance is $4 million due to improper shifting of income. It is known in forensic accounting as the "double up effect" that results from a company using a "cookie jar" reserve to manipulate future earnings.

Overstock.com's phony "gain contingency"

As I discussed above, Overstock.com falsely claimed that the future recoveries of amounts underbilled to fulfillment partners was a “gain contingency” because the recovery of such underbilled amounts "was not assured" (Sources: 2008 10-K, Q1 2009 10-Q, and Q2 2009 10-Q). See below:

When the underbilling was originally discovered, we determined that the recovery of such amounts was not assured, and that consequently the potential recoveries constituted a gain contingency. Accordingly, we determined that the appropriate accounting treatment for the potential recoveries was to record their benefit only when such amounts became realizable (i.e., an agreement had been reached with the partner and the partner had the wherewithal to pay). [Emphasis added.]

However, Overstock.com improperly failed to disclose any potential “gain contingency” in its prior Q3 2008 10-Q report, when it originally disclosed its accounting errors (See: SFAS No. 5 Paragraph 17b).

Overstock.com had already earned those "fees and charges" in prior periods from fulfillment partners. It simply underbilled them. Those fulfillment partners were already "contractually obligated to pay" such underbilled amounts. There was no question that Overstock.com was owed money from its fulfillment partners. As I will describe below, the recovery of substantial amounts due Overstock.com from underbilled fulfillment partners was assured, contrary to company claims that the collection of all such amounts was "not assured." Therefore, no gain contingency existed under accounting rules.

Overstock.com's ridiculous claim that the entire amount of underbillings to fulfillment partners was "not assured"

The company improperly claimed that the collection entire amount of underbillings to fulfillment partners was “not assured" rather than make a reasonable estimate of uncollectable amounts as required by SFAS No 5 paragraph 1, 2, 8 and 23. In other words, Overstock.com made the ridiculous claim that every single penny that it underbilled fulfillment partners in the past was uncollectible, even though it knew that significant amounts due from fulfillment partners (especially underbillings originating in 2008) were collectable. In fact, Overstock.com collected a significant amount of underbilled "fees and charges" from fulfillment partners in that same period (October 1 to December 31) that it announced its error (on October 24).

Following the money trail

When Overstock.com sells fulfillment partner inventory, customers promptly remit cash to the company. Afterwards, Overstock.com remits the portion cash proceeds due to its fulfillment partners for the inventory it sold to its customers.

According to Overstock.com’s “Supplier Agreement” with fulfillment vendors, the company (Source: Overstock.com correspondence to SEC Division of Corporation Finance):

Remit(s) semi-monthly payments within 2 business days of the 1st and 16th of each month for Product sold, subject to offsets. Payments shall be made net 30. [Emphasis added.]

Overstock.com floats the cash that it receives from customers and is later required to pay fulfillment partners in up to 30 days. In addition, Overstock.com retains the right to offset various errors against future remittances to its fulfillment partners. Therefore, if the fulfillment partners are still doing business with Overstock.com, all that the company had to do is to withhold a larger portion of the monthly remittances from such fulfillment partners (up to a few months, if necessary) to recover underbilling errors.

The greatest amount of the underbillings would certainly be attributable to its higher volume fulfillment partners who sold the most merchandise. Those high volume fulfillment partners are likely to be long time and current company suppliers of merchandise. Therefore, the ability to recoup a substantial share of previous underbillings to fulfillment partners could have been reasonably estimated, as required by Statement of Financial Accounting Principles No. 5. In many ways, Overstock.com's recovery of underbilled amounts due fulfillment partners was far more certain than recouping money in credit card disputes from its average customers.

Overstock.com collected significant amounts due from underbilled fulfillment partners in a very short period of time

In its "unreviewed" Q3 2009 10-Q, Overstock.com claimed that:

During 2008, we discovered that we had underbilled our fulfillment partners for certain fees and charges related to returns during 2007, and the nine months ended September 30, 2008, due to a systems issue. Of the total $5.5 million underbilling, $2.8 million related to 2007 and $2.7 million related to the nine months ended September 30, 2008. We contacted the affected fulfillment partners and in our negotiations with them over several months, we agreed to forgive the $2.8 million related to 2007 and to seek to recover the $2.7 million related to 2008 over time from our future sales of the fulfillment partners’ products during the remainder of 2008 and 2009. As a result of the negotiations we later agreed to forgive an additional $375,000. We have recovered a total of $2.3 million through September 30, 2009, including $1.8 million during the three months ended December 31, 2008 and $580,000 during the nine months ended September 30, 2009. [Emphasis added.]

Overstock.com announced its customer refund and credit error on October 24, 2008. During that same quarter (Q4 2008 or from October 1 to December 31), Overstock.com collected $1.8 million of $2.7 million underbilled amounts due from fulfillment partners that originated in 2008 or 66.67% of underbillings originating in 2008.

In the next quarter Q1 2009, Overstock.com collected another $453,000 of underbilled amounts due from fulfillment partners that originated in 2008 for a cumulative total of $2.253 million or 83.4% of underbillings originating in 2008.

To date, the company collected $2.34 million of $2.7 million of underbilled amounts due from fulfillment partners that originated in 2008 about 87% of underbilled amounts due from fulfillment partners originating in 2008! The collection of significant amounts due from underbilling fulfillment partners in 2008 was assured. The only question was how long it would take Overstock.com to collect such amounts.

During the Q3 2009 10-Q conference call, Patrick Byrne admitted:

...we collected ultimately $2.4 million. $1.8 million, we were actually able to collect in the fourth quarter. So -- and we learned about this and collected it quickly. Of the -- there's a remaining $600,000 that has dribbled in over this year and we recognize that as it came in. [Emphasis added.] 

Therefore, Overstock.com's management had to know that the collection of significant amounts due from underbilling of its fulfillment partners in 2008 was assured, contrary to its disclosure that "the recovery of such amounts was not assured, and that consequently the potential recoveries constituted a gain contingency."

Overstock.com miserably failed to make a reasonable estimate of amounts collectable from its fulfillment partners. The company ridiculously claimed that the collection the entire amount of underbillings due from its fulfillment partners originating in 2008 "was not assured" in justifying its false claimed gain contingency regarding amounts owed it.
Other unanswered questions

Another unanswered question is how could Overstock.com, without any hint as it claims, entirely miss such a large magnitude of underbillings to fulfillment partners ($2.8 million in 2007 and $2.7 million from Q1 to Q3 2008) and the overpayments to a fulfillment partner ($785,000 in the same period) with a combined total of $6.285 million in just 21 months? Add to that total another $301,000 of overbilling from a freight carrier in Q4 2008 and you have $6.586 million in money going out the door within a 24 month period without anyone claiming to notice it. Yet during the entire period, CEO Patrick Byrne and former CFO David Chidester signed Sarbanes-Oxley certifications attesting to adequate internal controls and PricewaterhouseCoopers issued clean audit opinions. Why aren't heads rolling at the company, starting from the audit committee, the CEO, and the CFO?

In April 2008, Jonathan Johnson sold almost $1 million in stock (Details here). The next month, then CFO David Chidester cashed out about $77,000 from selling his Overstock.com shares. As I detailed above, in October 2008 Overstock.com announced its customer refund and credit errors and restated its financial reports without taking into account offsetting costs and reimbursements due from its fulfillment partners.

In January 2009, former CFO David Chidester was merely demoted to Senior Vice President, Internal Reporting and Information. In other words, he is still intimately involved in the company's financial reporting process. In March 2009, James V. Joyce departed from the Board of Directors and received a mysterious $1.25 million "bonus" exit payment for terminating his consulting agreement with the company or about 3.5 times his annual compensation under that agreement.

I have some answers and I hope to explore those unanswered questions more thoroughly with the SEC in the near future.

Patrick Byrne ducked crucial questions during the "unreviewed" Q3 2009 10-Q conference call

I was not permitted to ask any questions while I attended Overstock.com's "unreviewed" Q3 2009 10-Q conference call. Patrick Byrne and his other nitwits Jonathan Johnson and Steve Chesnut were trying to stonewall any serious discussion of the specific issues I detailed above.
Jonathan Johnson, knowing that I was on the call and wanted to ask questions, lied and said:

Well we don't have any other questions lined up.

He cut short the conference call and the management team ran for the exits.

GAAP requires restatement of Overstock.com's financial reports to correct all errors

Under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 154, Overstock.com is required to restate each affected prior period financial report to reflect when the underbilled cost reimbursements and fees due from fulfillment partners were actually earned by the company (accrual basis or GAAP).
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 requires Overstock.com to offset such accrued income in each restated financial period with a reasonable estimate of uncollectable underbilled amounts.

In any case it is the SEC's position that "GAAP does not allow for the deferral of accounting adjustments arising from a change in estimate or the correction of an error." Source: Cease and Desist order issued In the matter of Carl M. Apel, and Administrative Proceeding in the Matter of Sun Communities Inc. and Sun Communities Operating Limited Partnership, Cease and Desist Order Issued in the Matter of National Steel Corporation). Therefore, no matter what excuse Overstock.com comes up with, its financial reports must be restated to correct all of its accounting errors and Grant Thornton concurred that a restatement was required too, before they were fired.

Other issues

Patrick Byrne has raised the issue of my involvement with Barry Minkow and Usana (NYSE: USNA) while acknowledging that I am "an expert in the business of exposing frauds." Allow me to reiterate that I have not been compensated by any party, that I was never compensated by any party, and that no party has ever promised to compensate me for analyzing Overstock.com's accounting and financial disclosures. I do not own any position in Overstock.com securities, I never had any position in Overstock.com securities, and I will never take any position in Overstock.com securities. My analysis of Overstock.com, the actions of its directors, management and auditors, and its financial reporting is a free voluntary public service to the SEC.

My interest in Overstock.com has not waned and will not wane despite Patrick Byrne's personal attacks on myself and my character and efforts by his paid crony Judd Bagley to interfere in my divorce which are specifically designed to discourage me from analyzing the company's financial disclosures and from engaging in communications such as this one with you.

If anything, Patrick Byrne's deliberate efforts to attack my credibility and character, rather than promptly correct Overstock.com's financial reporting violations after they were alerted by me in February 2009 provides clear evidence of scienter under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).

Respectfully,

Sam E. Antar

Note:

Please read my guest article in Newsweek entitled, "Bernie Madoff's Giant Ponzi Scheme" and Crain's New York Business article entitled "Crazy Like a Fox" by Aaron Elstein.

Other bloggers closely following financial reporting violations by Overstock.com are:

Forensic accountant and author Tracy Coenen,
Investigative journalist and author Gary Weiss, and
Blogger William K. Wolfrum (here and here).

Disclosure:

I am a convicted felon and a former CPA. As the criminal CFO of Crazy Eddie, I helped Eddie Antar and other members of his family mastermind one of the largest securities frauds uncovered during the 1980's. If it weren't for the efforts of the FBI, SEC, Postal Inspector's Office, and class action plaintiff's lawyers who investigated, prosecuted, and sued me, I would still be the criminal CFO of Crazy Eddie today.

I do not own Overstock.com securities short or long. My research on Overstock.com and in particular its lying CEO Patrick Byrne is a freebie for securities regulators and the public in order to help me get into heaven, though I doubt that I will ever get there anyway. I will probably end up joining corporate miscreants such as Patrick Byrne in hell.

In any case, exposing corporate crooks is a lot of fun for a forcibly "retired" crook like me and analyzing Overstock.com's financial reporting is a forensic accountant's wet dream.

Monday, October 26, 2009

Patrick Byrne To Tough It Out With SEC Over GAAP Violations

Apparently, Overstock.com (NASDAQ: OSTK) is going to stubbornly tough it out and force the Securities and Exchange Commission to take enforcement action to make its financial reports comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The SEC re-opened its investigation of Overstock.com in response to a series of investigative reports by this blog documenting continuing GAAP violations by the company and other false and misleading representations to investors by its management team, led by CEO Patrick M. Byrne.

Flawed financial reports incorporated in new registration statement

Earlier today, Overstock.com filed a registration statement in connection with its 2005 Equity Incentive Plan. CEO Patrick M. Byrne, CFO Steven J. Chesnut, audit committee members Allison H. Abraham, Clay Corbus, and Joseph J. Tabacco Jr. all signed off on Overstock.com's SEC filing. In addition, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), Overstock.com's former auditors, consented to the company using flawed financial reports in its SEC filing. See below:


CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM 
We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in this Registration Statement on Form S-8 of our report dated February 23, 2009 relating to the financial statements, financial statement schedule and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which appears in Overstock.com, Inc.’s Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2008.
/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Salt Lake City, UT
October 26, 2009

As I will detail below, Overstock.com's 2008 Annual Report on Form 10K/A contained material accounting errors and GAAP violations that were overlooked by PWC during the course of its audit. Therefore, internal controls of financial reporting was ineffective. Worst yet, PWC has given similar consents to Overstock.com in the past, only to have such financial reports later restated due to GAAP violations.

Summary of latest GAAP violations exposed in this blog

In October 2008, Overstock.com disclosed new customer credit and refund accounting errors and restated all financial reports from Q1 2003 to Q2 2008 to reflect an additional $8.2 million of claimed accumulated losses in prior reporting periods. It was the second time in two years that Overstock.com restated its financial reports due a violation of GAAP. PWC had erroneously given clean audit opinions on the company's financial reports before each restatement correcting GAAP violations for such reports.

Those customer refund and credit errors also caused Overstock.com to underbill earned income due from its fulfillment partners for offsetting costs and reimbursements. Overstock.com restated its prior financial reports to correct its customer refund and credit errors. However, the company failed to make offsetting corrections and properly accrue underbilled income earned from its fulfillment partners in those same affected prior reporting periods, as required by GAAP.

Instead, Overstock.com improperly recognized income from its underbilled fulfillment partners using a non-GAAP cash basis as amounts were collected future accounting periods: Q4 2008 $1.8 million, Q1 2009 estimated at $1.4 million, and Q2 2009 $87k. For additional details see SFAS No. 154 and SFAS No. 5 paragraph 1, 2, 8, 22, and 23.

In effect, Overstock.com improperly created a "cookie jar reserve" to inflate earnings in future reporting periods. For example, the company should have reported a Q4 2008 loss, but instead reported a profit for that quarter by violating GAAP. That improperly reported net profit enabled Overstock.com to report its first quarterly profit after a string of 15 consecutive quarterly losses and beat mean analysts’ consensus expectations for earnings per share (See: SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 about Materiality).

Overstock.com's phony "gain contingency" excuse

After my early blog posts (here and here) detailing Overstock.com's above GAAP violation, the company later claimed that when it initially discovered the accounting error, it immediately determined that a “gain contingency” existed on underbilled amounts due from fulfillment partners because "recovery of such amounts was not assured." See below:

When the underbilling was originally discovered, we determined that the recovery of such amounts was not assured, and that consequently the potential recoveries constituted a gain contingency. Accordingly, we determined that the appropriate accounting treatment for the potential recoveries was to record their benefit only when such amounts became realizable (i.e., an agreement had been reached with the partner and the partner had the wherewithal to pay). [Emphasis added.]

However, in my report to the SEC, I showed that no gain contingency existed because:

(1) The company already earned amounts due from underbilling its fulfillment partners in prior reporting periods,
(2) Its fulfillment partners were already contractually liable to pay all underbilled amounts from prior reporting periods, and
(3) The collection of large sums of such underbilled amounts due from its fulfillment partners was reasonably assured.

Both Overstock.com and PWC had to know that the collection of significant amounts due from underbilling of its fulfillment partners was assured, contrary to its disclosure that "the recovery of such amounts was not assured, and that consequently the potential recoveries constituted a gain contingency."

Overstock.com floats the cash that it receives from customers and is later required to pay fulfillment partners in up to 30 days. The company has the right to offset various errors against future remittances to its fulfillment partners. The company can withhold a larger portion of the monthly remittances from such fulfillment partners (up to a few months, if necessary) to recover underbilling errors.

Overstock.com did not have to reach an agreement with its fulfillment partners on underbilled amounts as it claimed, since its supplier agreement already allowed for such offsets (Source: Overstock.com correspondence to SEC Division of Corporation Finance). In addition, the greatest amount of the underbillings would certainly be attributable to its higher volume fulfillment partners who sold the most merchandise and are likely to be long time and current company suppliers.

Therefore, Overstock.com's ability to recoup a substantial share of previous underbillings to fulfillment partners could have been reasonably estimated, as required by Statement of Financial Accounting Principles No. 5. In many ways, Overstock.com's recovery of underbilled amounts due from its fulfillment partners was far more certain than recouping money in ordinary credit card disputes from its average customers.

In the eighteen months prior to disclosing its accounting error, the gross potential amount the company underbilled its fulfillment partners was about $4.7 million (See my calculations here). Over $3 million of such amounts due from underbilling its fulfillment partners was actually recovered within weeks and months after the company initially discovered the underbilling errors.

Overstock.com and PWC should have also considered subsequent corrected billings to and collections from fulfillment partners after the cutoff date of each financial report and before it filed its respective Q3 2008 10-Q and full year 2008 10-K reports with the SEC.

In other words, if new information, known as "subsequent events" is received after the cut-off date of a financial report but before the filing of such report which affects either assets or income in that financial report, a company must adjust its financial report to reflect that new information. (See: SAS No. 1 Paragraph 1, 2, 3, and 7 and Letter from SEC Chief Accountant entitled "Audit Risk").

Therefore, no gain contingency existed since underbilled amounts due from fulfillment partners was already earned, the fulfillment partners were already contractually required to pay such underbilled amounts, and a substantial amount due to the company from underbilling fulfillment partners was reasonably assured, contrary to company disclosures.

In any case, Securities and Exchange Commission’s interpretation of accounting rules is that “GAAP do not allow for the deferral of accounting adjustments arising from a change in estimate or the correction of error.” (Source: Cease and Desist order issued “In the matter of Carl M. Apel”). Overstock.com cannot defer income from underbilling its fulfillment partners to future accounting periods.

New Evidence of a botched audit by PWC and Overstock.com's failure to take into account subsequent events

In its Q3 2008 10-Q report, fiscal year 2008 10-K/A report, and Q1 2009 10-Q report, Overstock.com made no subsequent events disclosure. However, in Q2 2009 10-Q report, the company finally made such a disclosure (Footnote 15, page 22):

Management evaluated activity of Overstock.com through July 31, 2009 (the issue date of the Unaudited Consolidated Financial Statements) and concluded that no subsequent events have occurred that would require recognition in the Unaudited Consolidated Financial Statements or disclosure in the Notes to the Unaudited Consolidated Financial Statements. [Emphasis added.]

Why was the subsequent events disclosure omitted from prior financial reports? As I detailed above, Overstock.com failed to consider subsequent corrected billings to and collections from its fulfillment partners. Overstock.com's 2008 10-K/A financial report was audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the 2009 10-K financial report will be audited by Grant Thornton.

Note: A reader has alerted me that Overstock.com’s subsequent events disclosure in Q2 2009 is new required disclosure under SFAS 165. In any case, Overstock.com was required to take into account those subsequent events (corrected billings to and collections from its fulfillment partners) and the company was required to make subsequent events adjustments and disclosures under existing accounting guidance and SEC rules at the time financial reports were issued for Q3 2008, Q4 2008, and Q1 2009. In addition, as I detailed above, no gain contingency existed for underbilled amounts due from fulfillment partners as claimed by the company. Therefore, PWC still botched the 2008 audit.

Grant Thornton

Grant Thornton, will face a dilemma. Overstock.com’s GAAP violations in 2008 caused material errors in 2009 financial reports that Grant Thornton must audit. Will Grant Thornton will go out on a limb and risk issuing a clean audit opinion without Overstock.com restating financial reports to correct its GAAP violations?

Written by:

Sam E. Antar

Disclosure:
I am a convicted felon and a former CPA. As the criminal CFO of Crazy Eddie, I helped Eddie Antar and other members of his family mastermind one of the largest securities frauds uncovered during the 1980's.

I do not own Overstock.com securities short or long. My research on Overstock.com and in particular its lying CEO Patrick Byrne is a freebie for securities regulators and the public in order to help me get into heaven, though I doubt that I will ever get there anyway. I will probably end up joining corporate miscreants such as Patrick Byrne in hell.

Wednesday, July 29, 2009

How to Issue Phony Financial Reports and Mislead Investors – Overstock.com and Patrick M. Byrne Style

In three previous blog posts, I detailed how Overstock.com (NASDAQ: OSTK) violated Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and SEC disclosure rules by improperly deferring the recognition of an accounting error to create a cookie jar reserve to inflate future profits. On October 24, 2008, Overstock.com revealed that it underbilled fulfillment partners in periods prior to Q3 2008 because of customer refund and credit errors. The company improperly chose to recognize future recoveries from underbilling its fulfillment partners on a cash basis (non-GAAP) rather than restating previously issued financial reports to correct the material accounting error (GAAP). Note: Details of my previous blog posts here, here, and here).

More recently, I provided Overstock.com with a series of questions to answer about its accounting errors during its Q2 2009 earnings call (Details here). Rather than answer each of my questions, CEO Patrick Byrne went on a ranting diatribe as described by investigative journalist Gary Weiss in his blog (Details here).

The reason for avoiding any meaningful discussion of Overstock.com’s questionable financial disclosures is clear. Overstock.com and Patrick Byrne are desperately trying to avoid restating the company’s financial reports due to accounting errors for the third time in three years.

I will come back to this point later in this blog post. However, first let’s examine Overstock.com’s consistent pattern of financial reporting irregularities and lies by management to investors.

Overstock.com’s history is littered with a consistent pattern of false and misleading financial disclosures and lies by management about the company’s financial performance and compliance with securities laws

Since, its inception in 1999, Overstock.com is has yet to produce a financial report that has not at least initially violated GAAP and SEC disclosure rules. In fact, certain financial reports from 2003 to 2005 were restated twice to correct accounting errors.

From December 2000 to March 2002, Patrick Byrne lied about Overstock.com’s financial performance in a series of interviews on national television and in various publications prior to the company’s initial public offering in March 2002. Patrick Byrne deceptively used pro forma non-GAAP “gross value merchandise value sales” (instead of the lower GAAP commission revenue) to hype the company’s top-line performance in order to falsely claim that Overstock.com was profitable, when it never was profitable (Details here).

In April 2004, Patrick Byrne appeared on the Kudlow and Cramer show on CNBC and commented about GAAP and a non-GAAP pro forma measure called "Earnings before interest, depreciation, and amortization" or EBITDA:

Well, first of all, I’m all about GAAP. I have been so critical of the companies that do–I don’t believe in one-time charges; I don’t believe in EBITDA. If somebody talks EBITDA, put your hand on your wallet; they’re a crook. [Emphasis added.]

In October 2004, Patrick Byrne bragged, "We don't resort to any pro forma accounting tricks to make the numbers look better." In January 2006, Patrick Byrne made the following comment about EBITDA to Tom Mullaney from Business Week in an email:

"…I think “EBITDA” is the stupidest thing I ever heard emanate from Wall Street (no small feat)...."

Over the next few years, it became clear that Overstock.com never issued a financial report for any quarterly reporting period that initially conformed to GAAP or SEC disclosure rules, despite Byrne's April 2004 claim that he was "all about GAAP." Overstock.com even resorted to reporting a non-compliant EBITDA that violated SEC rules. As I will demonstrate below, Overstock.com did not comply with both GAAP and allowable non-GAAP financial measures (such as EBITDA) under SEC rules. In other words, investors are cautioned to be skeptical of any disclosure coming from Overstock.com and its management team led by corporate miscreant Patrick Byrne.

In February 2006, Overstock.com restated financial reports dating from 2002 to 2005 due to inventory accounting errors. Only because of Overstock.com's inventory build up at that time, the timing of Overstock.com's inventory accounting error disclosure enabled Patrick Byrne to boast that the company's numbers were too conservative. However, Overstock.com's later restatement of financial reports announced in October 2008 wiped out previous positive adjustments to income from correcting its inventory accounting error by a factor of three.

In Q4 2006, Overstock.com took advantage of record losses and inflated inventory reserves. Former company President Jason C. Lindsey told investors that, "we used the fourth quarter to get rid of all the slow-moving inventory. I am quite pleased with the inventory balances we have now. ...I am pleased that the fourth quarter is now over. We have sold it."

However, Overstock.com later disclosed that inventory reserves had actually increased in both relative and absolute amounts. If Overstock.com had actually sold "all the slow-moving inventory as claimed by Lindsey, there is no way that inventory reserves can increase in both absolute and relative terms. The company overstated its inventory reserves to create a cookie jar reserve so it could increase profits in fiscal year 2007 (Details here).

From Q2 2007 to Q2 2008, Overstock.com violated SEC Regulation G by reporting a non-compliant “Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization” or EBITDA to materially overstate its financial performance.

As I detailed above, Patrick Byrne had previously claimed that "I don’t believe in EBITDA. If somebody talks EBITDA, put your hand on your wallet; they’re a crook." He said that “EBITDA is the stupidest thing I ever heard emanate from Wall Street." Therefore, Patrick Byrne is "stupid" and a "crook" by his own definition, since Overstock.com used a non-compliant EBITDA to materially overstate its financial performance in violation of SEC Regulation G.

Despite Byrne's prior statements, Overstock.com improperly reconciled its non-compliant EBITDA to operating income rather than net income and improperly excluded stock-based compensation costs from its non-compliant EBITDA measure. When pressed by me to discuss Overstock.com's non-compliant EBITDA disclosures, CEO Patrick Byrne, company President Jonathan E. Johnson, former CFO David Chidester, now demoted by the company, lied to investors in a conference call about Overstock.com’s compliance with SEC Regulation G (Details here).

Lee Webb from Stockwatch chronicled my year long battle with Overstock.com to successfully force the company to comply with SEC Regulation G for certain non-GAAP financial disclosures and my ongoing battle to force the company to comply with GAAP and SEC rules in reporting certain accounting errors (Details here).

In January 2008, former company President Jason C. Lindsey backdated his resignation (Details here).

In January 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission discovered that Overstock.com's revenue accounting failed to comply with GAAP and SEC disclosure rules, from the company's inception (Details here). This blog detailed how the company improperly provided the SEC with a flawed and misleading materiality analysis to convince regulators that its revenue accounting error was not material to avoid restating its financial reports (Details here).

Instead of restating prior financial reports to correct its material revenue accounting error, Overstock.com improperly used a one-time cumulative adjustment in its Q4 2007 financial report to hide the material impact of such errors on prior reporting periods. In Q4 2007, Overstock.com’s one-time cumulative adjustment reduced revenues by $13.7 million and increased net losses by $2.1 million resulting from the one-time cumulative adjustment to correct its revenue accounting errors.

In April 2008, Company President Jonathan E. Johnson lied to Wired.com about Overstock.com’s GAAP compliance in reporting revenues. In a financial report, Overstock.com compared Q1 2008 GAAP revenues to non-GAAP Q1 2007 revenues. At that time Overstock.com failed to restate Q1 2007 revenues to correct material revenue accounting errors uncovered by the SEC (Details here). Shortly afterwards, Johnson sold almost $1 million in stock (Details here). The next month, now demoted CFO David Chidester cashed out about $77,000 from selling his Overstock.com shares. Several months later, Overstock.com had to restate Q1 2007 revenues.

On October 24, 2008, Overstock.com disclosed new customer refund and credit errors and it company warned investors that all previous financial reports issued from 2003 to Q2 2008 “should no longer be relied upon.” This time, Overstock.com restated all financial reports dating back to 2003. In addition, Overstock.com reversed its one-time cumulative adjustment in Q4 2007 used to correct its revenue accounting errors and also restated all financial statements to correct those errors, as I previously recommended.

The company reported that the combined amount of revenue accounting errors (previously uncovered by the SEC) and newly disclosed customer refund and credit accounting errors resulted in a cumulative reduction in previously reported revenues of $12.9 million and an increase in previously reported accumulated losses of $10.3 million.

Since Overstock.com had previously reported an increase in accumulated losses from its revenue accounting error of $2.1 million (see above), its new customer refund and credit errors resulted in an additional $8.2 million in accumulated losses in prior reporting periods.

It was the second time in three years that Overstock.com had to restate its financial reports and the company filed amended reports with the SEC. In addition, Overstock.com corrected its non-compliant EBITDA measure (as described above) in those amended financial reports. However, the explanatory note to those amended financial reports filed with the SEC, Overstock.com only made reference to corrections of its revenue accounting errors customer refund and credit errors, but made no reference to correcting its non-compliant EBITDA to comply with SEC Regulation G.

Overstock.com inflates losses from an accounting error to create a cookie jar reserve to increase income in future accounting periods

As I will detail below, Overstock.com’s additional accumulated losses of $8.2 million in prior reporting periods from its customer refund and credit errors were improperly overstated by at least $3.0 million dollars to create a cookie jar reserve to inflate future earnings. In its restatement of prior period financial reports, Overstock.com failed to include accruals of income for amounts due to the company from underbilling its fulfillment partners for offsetting costs and reimbursements, less a reasonable estimate of uncollectible amounts, as required by GAAP.

Instead, Overstock.com improperly recognized over $3 million of such underbilling recoveries over three future quarters (Q4 2008, Q1 2009 and Q2 2009) as income on a cash basis. As a result, Overstock.com improperly deferred recognition of an accounting error over future periods and materially inflated income during those periods. In effect, Overstock.com wrongfully corrected an accounting error over two or more periods by using a cookie jar reserve.

The SEC does not permit the correction of an accounting error “prospectively, over two of more periods”

In a “cease and desist order” issued “In the matter of Carl M. Apel,” the Securities and Exchange Commission took the following position:


The correction of error, including erroneous estimates related to loss contingencies, should be disclosed in the period in which the error is discovered. The correction is accounted for and reported as a prior period adjustment, that is, by restating the financial statements of the affected prior periods. See FAS 16, Prior Period Adjustments (June 1977) [as partially superseded by FAS 109, Accounting For Income Taxes (February 1992) ¶288(n)]; APB 20, ¶¶13, 36 and 37; and APB 9, Reporting the Results of Operations (December 1966) ¶¶18 and 26. 
As these provisions make clear, GAAP do not allow for the deferral of accounting adjustments arising from a change in estimate or the correction of error. If a change in estimate affects one period only, the change may not be accounted for over two or more periods in order to diminish the effect of the change on income, or for any other purpose. Correction of error may not be accounted for prospectively, or over two or more periods, in order to diminish the effect of the correction on any one period. [Emphasis added.]

As the SEC makes clear, “GAAP do not allow for the deferral of accounting adjustments arising from a change in estimate or the correction of error” and “Correction of error may not be accounted for prospectively, or over two or more periods, in order to diminish the effect of the correction on any one period.” However, Overstock.com prospectively corrected its accounting errors from underbilling fulfillment partners over three periods and violated GAAP and SEC rules.

After my original blog post exposed Overstock.com’s latest financial reporting violations, the company is desperately trying to avoid a third restatement of its financial reports due to the improper deferral of income from recovering offsetting cost reimbursements and fees against its customer refund and credit errors from its fulfillment partners.

Q4 2008: Overstock.com’s improper accounting of customer refund and credit errors

On January 30, 2009, Overstock.com reported a net profit of $1 million profit and $.04 earnings per share for Q4 2008, after 15 consecutive quarterly losses and it beat mean analysts’ consensus expectations of negative $0.04 earnings per share. CEO Patrick Byrne gloated to investors, "After a tough three years, returning to GAAP profitability is a relief."

However, Overstock.com's press release failed to disclose that its $1 million reported profit resulted from a one-time gain of $1.8 million relating to payments received from fulfillment partners for amounts previously underbilled them. Later, during the earnings call, CFO Steve Chesnut finally admitted to investors that:

Gross profit dollars were $43.6 million, a 6% decrease. This included a one-time gain of $1.8 million relating to payments from partners who were under-billed earlier in the year. [Emphasis added.]

As I detailed above, Overstock.com already disclosed in an October 24, 2008 press release that it failed to bill its fulfillment partners for offsetting cost reimbursements and fees resulting from its customer refund and credit errors. The company claimed to have already corrected those errors by restating all financial reports issued prior to Q3 2008 and it increased accumulated losses by $10.3 million.

As it turned out, Overstock.com improperly failed to include in its restatement of previously issued financial reports an accrual of amounts due the company from underbilling its fulfillment partners for offsetting costs and reimbursements, less a reasonable estimate of uncollectible amounts.

After the earnings call, I wrote blog post explaining that if Overstock.com properly followed accounting rules, it would have reported an $800,000 loss instead of a $1 million profit, it would have reported sixteen consecutive losses instead of 15 consecutive losses, and it would have failed to meet mean analysts’ consensus expectation for earnings per share (anyone of three materiality yardsticks under SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 that would have triggered a restatement of prior year’s effected financial reports).

Patrick Byrne responded to me on a stock market chat board

On February 6, 2009, Patrick M. Byrne responded to my blog post and tried to rationalize Overstock.com’s treatment of the “one-time gain” in an unsigned post, using an alias, on an internet stock market chat board. Byrne’s chat board post was later removed and re-posted with his name attached to it, after I complained to the SEC. Here is what Patrick Byrne told readers on the chat board:

Antar's ramblings are gibberish. Show them to any accountant and they will confirm. He has no clue what he is talking about.
For example: when one discovers that one underpaid some suppliers $1 million and overpaid others $1 million. For those whom one underpaid, one immediately recognizes a $1 million liability, and cleans it up by paying. For those one overpaid, one does not immediately book an asset of a $1 million receivable: instead, one books that as the monies flow in. Simple conservatism demands this (If we went to book the asset the moment we found it, how much should we book? The whole $1 million? An estimate of the portion of it we think we'll be able to collect?) The result is asymmetric treatment. Yet Antar is screaming his head off about this, while never once addressing this simple principle. Of course, if we had booked the found asset the moment we found it, he would have screamed his head off about that. Behind everything this guy writes, there is a gross obfuscation like this. His purpose is just to get as much noise out there as he can. [Emphasis added.]

Actually, Patrick Byrne confirmed that I was correct in saying that Overstock.com improperly used cash basis accounting (non-GAAP) rather than accrual basis accounting (GAAP) to correct its accounting error. In a follow up blog post, I criticized Byrne’s response noting that:

… Overstock.com recognized the "one-time of $1.8 million" using cash-basis accounting when it "received payments from partners who were under-billed earlier in the year" instead of accrual basis accounting, which requires income to be recognized when earned. A public company is not permitted to correct any accounting error using cash-basis accounting.
Patrick Byrne claimed that “…one books that as the monies flow in. Simple conservatism demands this…”

However, the SEC’s position is that you cannot abuse “conservatism” to “understate net assets and profits” or by overstating a loss from an accounting error to create a cookie jar reserve to increase income in future reporting periods. However, that's exactly what Overstock.com did.

SEC Chief Accountant’s position on abusing “conservatism”

In 1999, the SEC’s Chief Accountant concerned about “earnings management” by companies warned issuers against using “conservatism” to deliberately understate “net assets and profits” or, in effect, overstate losses. See below:

The SEC staff also has noted that some believe that conservatism is a characteristic that should be discussed. However, in SFAC 2 the FASB noted:
“Since a preference that possible errors in measurement be in the direction of understatement rather than overstatement of net income and net assets introduces a bias into financial reporting, conservatism tends to conflict with significant qualitative factors such as representational faithfulness, neutrality, and comparability (including consistency)...Conservatism in financial reporting should no longer connote deliberate, consistent understatement of net assets and profits...The Board emphasizes that any attempt to understate results consistently is likely to raise questions about the reliability and integrity of the information about those results and will probably be self-defeating in the long run.”
Accordingly, the consistent understating of results (i.e., conservatism) or overly optimistic estimates of realization (i.e., lack of conservatism or aggressiveness) are inconsistent with the characteristics of quality financial reporting needed for transparent reporting in today’s markets. As some have noted, an analogy can be made to the game of golf. One desires to hit the ball down the middle of the fairway to get the best result and longest drive. While staying in the fairway is acceptable, the quality of the drive is determined by how close to the middle one gets. The staff believes that it is important for financial management and auditors to communicate with the audit committee whether, and where, the ball is on the fairway. [Emphasis added.]

After Patrick Byrne’s chat board remarks confirming improper cash basis accounting, Overstock.com concocted a new excuse to justify Patrick Byrne’s stock market chat board ramblings.

How Overstock.com tried to justify using non-GAAP cash basis accounting to improperly defer correcting an accounting error in Q4 2008, Q1 2009, and Q2 2009

On February 23, 2009, Overstock.com filed its fiscal year 2008 10-K with the SEC and that report included Q4 2008’s quarterly numbers. The company tried to justify using cash basis accounting to correct its accounting error by saying that “When the underbilling was originally discovered, we determined that the recovery of such amounts was not assured, and that consequently the potential recoveries constituted a gain contingency.” See below:

In addition, during Q4 2008, we reduced Cost of Goods Sold by $1.8 million for billing recoveries from partners who were underbilled earlier in the year for certain fees and charges that they were contractually obligated to pay. When the underbilling was originally discovered, we determined that the recovery of such amounts was not assured, and that consequently the potential recoveries constituted a gain contingency. Accordingly, we determined that the appropriate accounting treatment for the potential recoveries was to record their benefit only when such amounts became realizable (i.e., an agreement had been reached with the partner and the partner had the wherewithal to pay). [Emphasis added.]

In Q1 2009, Overstock.com continued to claim that it could recognize income from recovering previous underbillings of its fulfillment partners on a cash basis due to a "gain contingency." In addition, the company disclosed yet another accounting error originating in Q4 2008 resulting from overbillings by a freight carrier. Overstock.com improperly recognized that accounting error as income in Q2 2009, rather than restate its Q4 2008 financial report as required by GAAP:

In Q1 2009, we reduced total cost of goods sold by $1.9 million for recoveries from partners who were underbilled in 2008 for certain fees and charges that they were contractually obligated to pay and a refund due of overbillings by a freight carrier for charges from Q4 2008.

During the earnings call that followed Overstock.com’s Q1 2009 press release, Patrick Byrne gave a fuzzy quantification of the “overbilling by a freight carrier for charges from Q4 2008. He said:

…we did get the benefit of a shipping billing benefit of some several hundred thousand dollars and so forth.

In Q2 2009, Overstock.com collected another $87,000 from fulfillment partners. During the earnings call, Patrick Byrne reiterated Overstock.com's claim that a "gain contingency" existed for underbilled amounts due from fulfillment partners:


First question is when the under-billing was originally discovered, we determined that the recovery of such amounts was not assured and consequently the potential recovery constituted a gain contingency.
That's correct, as we unraveled in the fourth quarter last year, and so Sam then asks a whole bunch of questions about this.
But the short answer is we unraveled this in the fourth quarter. It all came about simultaneously with the facts leading to the restatement. And when you discover that you owe people money, or that you're not owed money that you thought you were owed, you announce that immediately when you discover that you think you've under-billed other people, that's called a contingent gain, and you don't get to book the entire thing as an asset immediately, because you got to go and collect it. [Emphasis added.]

According to claims in Overstock.com’s financial disclosures to the SEC and Byrne’s comments during the Q2 2009 earnings call, the decision to consider future recoveries from underbilling fulfillment partners as a "gain contingency" was made at the time the underbilling error was discovered. If that is really true, the date such discovery had to have been much earlier than October 20, 2008, the date that the Board of Directors approved the company's restatement of previously issued financial reports to correct customer refund and credit errors (Source: 8-K report page 5).

However, auditing and SEC rules require that a company take into account material events affecting the measurement or realization of assets in a financial report up to the date that either the final 10-Q report or 10-K report is filed with the commission (See: SAS No. 1 Paragraph 1, 2, 3, and 7 and Letter from SEC Chief Accountant entitled "Audit Risk"). In other words, if new information is received after the cut-off date that affects either assets or income in a financial report, a company must adjust its financial report to reflect that new information.

If Overstock.com's explanation of a gain contingency is to be believed, the company improperly determined that a gain contingency existed when it first discovered underbilling its fulfillment partners, instead of spending any time trying to determine the recoverability of such underbilled amounts.

Overstock.com should have waited at least until November 7, 2008 (or 38 days into the fourth quarter) when it filed its Q3 2008 10-Q report before making a final determination as to the collectibility of underbilled amounts due from fulfillment partners as of the end of Q3 2008.

In fact, the company could have waited an additional seven days to determine the collectibility of underbilled amounts due from fulfillment partners and still filed its 10-Q report on time. If management truly wanted to make a reasonable estimate as to the collectibility of underbilled amounts due from fulfillment partners, Overstock.com could have properly filed a late 10-Q report by explaining the circumstances. It didn't. Apparently, management deliberately tried to avoid restating its financial reports for a third time in three years.

In any case, no gain contingency existed at all and Overstock.com collected $1.8 million in underbilled amounts from its fulfillment partners during Q4 2008. Since Overstock.com filed its Q3 2008 10-Q report 38 days into the fourth quarter, management had to know that large amounts due from underbilling its fulfillment partners were in fact collectible.

Therefore, Overstock.com cannot claim that "we determined that the recovery of such amounts was not assured, and that consequently the potential recoveries constituted a gain contingency". In fact, the recovery of large amounts of previously underbilled amounts was "assured" since the company quickly recovered $1.8 million in Q4 2008.

Why Overstock.com’s claimed “gain contingency” is a false representation to investors
Overstock.com had already earned those "fees and charges" in prior periods from fulfillment partners. It simply underbilled them. Those fulfillment partners were already "contractually obligated to pay" such underbilled amounts. In addition, there was no question that Overstock.com was owed money from its fulfillment partners and that the recovery of substantial amounts was assured. Therefore, no gain contingency existed under accounting rules.

If there was any question as to the recovery of any amounts owed the company, management is required to make a reasonable estimate of uncollectible amounts (loss contingency) and book an appropriate reserve against amounts due from fulfillment partners. By immediately considering underbilled amounts due from fulfillment partners as a gain contingency, the company failed to make a reasonable estimate of such uncollectible amounts and violated accounting rules or GAAP (See SFAS No. 5 paragraph 1, 2, 8, 22, and 23).

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 154 requires Overstock.com to restate affected prior period financial reports to reflect when the underbilled cost reimbursements and fees were actually earned by the company (accrual basis or GAAP). Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.5 requires Overstock.com to offset such accrued income in each restated financial period with a reasonable estimate of uncollectible underbilled amounts.

Therefore, Overstock.com overstated its customer refund and credit accounting error by failing restate its prior affected financial reports and accrue underbilled amounts due from its fulfillment partners as income in the appropriate accounting periods, less a reasonable reserve for unrecoverable amounts. By improperly deferring recognition of income until underbilled amounts were collected, the company used non-GAAP cash basis accounting to effectively create a "cookie jar" reserve to increase future earnings.

In addition, Overstock.com improperly failed to disclose any potential “gain contingency” in its Q3 2008 10-Q report, when it disclosed that it underbilled its fulfillment partners (See SFAS No. 5 Paragraph 17b). Was management's claimed "gain contingency" a backdated made up attempt to cover up the company's improper treatment of an accounting error? The "gain contingency" disclosure only appeared in Overstock.com's fiscal year 2008 10-K after I criticized its improper treatment of the underbilling error in my blog.

The only way that Overstock.com could recognize income from underbilling its fulfillment partners in future accounting periods is if there was a “significant uncertainty as to collection” of all underbilled amounts (See SFAS No. 5 paragraph 23). As it turns out, a large portion of the underbilled amounts to fulfillment partners was easily recoverable within a very brief period of time. Therefore, no “significant uncertainty as to collection” existed.

During Q4 2008, Overstock.com collected a total of “$1.8 million relating to payments from partners who were underbilled earlier in the year.” Overstock.com filed its Q3 2008 10-Q report 38 days into that quarter and clearly should have known by that time that significant amounts owed by fulfillment partners from underbilling them in the past was actually collectible and that no gain contingency existed as to such amounts.

On February 23, 2009, Overstock.com filed its annual audited 10-K report with the SEC. By that time, Overstock.com clearly knew that $1.8 million in underbilled amounts due from fulfillment partners was collected by December 31, 2008. In addition, Overstock.com collected over $1.5 million in underbilled amounts during Q1 2009. Since Overstock.com issued its 10-K report 54 days into Q1 2009, the auditors should have known that no gain contingency existed for underbilled amounts due from fulfillment partners. Overstock.com "dismissed" PricewaterhouseCoopers as its auditors and replaced them with Grant Thornton, shortly thereafter.

To summarize the material financial distortions caused by Overstock.com’s improper deferral of income from an accounting error, see the chart below (Click on image to enlarge):


Taking advantage of convertible debt holders and other one-time items aid Overstock.com's financial performance.

In November 2004, Overstock.com raised new cash through the issuance of convertible debt securities. Since that offering, Overstock.com restated its financial reports from 2003 to 2004 two times. In other words, Overstock.com's convertible debt holders relied on financial reports that violated GAAP and SEC disclosure rules.

In Q1 2009, and Q2 2009, Overstock.com reported gains of $1.926 million and $0.884 million respectively from buying back such debt at a discount to its face value, thereby taking advantage of those investors who relied on financial reports that violated GAAP and SEC rules.

In Q1 and Q2 2009, Overstock.com benefited from the reimbursement of legal fees due to an insurance settlement in the amount of $0.6 million each quarter.

In Q1 2009, Overstock.com made a one-time exit payment departing director James. V. Joyce.

In Q2 2009, Overstock.com benefited from one-time adjustments relating to a change of estimate involving past accrued restructuring charges totaling $0.218 million. See the chart below (Click on image to enlarge):



As the above chart demonstrates, Overstock.com only reported profits in Q4 2008 and Q2 2009 due to GAAP violations, buying back debt issued under false pretenses at a profit, and other one-time benefits. Overstock.com has never reported a profitable year during its entire existence and has accumulated losses of over $266 million. The company has a negative net worth of $4 million.

To be continued.....

Written by:

Sam E. Antar

Disclosure:

I am a convicted felon and a former CPA. As the criminal CFO of Crazy Eddie, I helped Eddie Antar and other members of his family mastermind one of the largest securities frauds uncovered during the 1980's.

I do not own Overstock.com securities short or long. My research on Overstock.com and in particular its lying CEO Patrick Byrne is a freebie for securities regulators and the public in order to help me get into heaven, though I doubt that I will ever get there anyway. I will probably end up joining corporate miscreants such as Patrick Byrne in hell.